Comments
"ENTRY" AS AN ISSUE IN IMMIGRATION LAW

Often the first issue a court or administrative body must address in determining the right of an alien to remain in the United
States is whether the alien has made an "entry." The term means
much more than simply being physically present in the country
and its implications are profound. Section 101 (a)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act sets forth the statutory definition of
"entry." This Comment examines each of the elements of the statutory definition and surveys the various interpretationsthereof by
federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "ENTRY"
One fundamental characteristic of sovereignty is that a nation
may prescribe the terms and conditions by which an alien may enter
that nation.' An alien has no right to enter the United States unless
Congress 2 grants it to him;3 he has no constitutional rights regarding
his application for entry.4 However, once the alien has made an "entry" into the United States, his status changes and he is afforded
1. [It is an] accepted principle of international law that every sovereign nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, to
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe ....
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904). See also United
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 261 (1905); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892).
2. "The establishment of requirements for entry into the United States is a political decision which rests with Congress." Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 134 n. 3 (5th
Cir. 1978). See also Grubisich v. Esperdy, 175 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N:Y. 1959).
3. United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279, 280-81 (1932)
(Holmes, J.). Accord United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542
(1950). Even a returning alien has no unconditional right to re-enter. See, e.g., Polymeris
v. Trudell, 284 U.S. at 281. Similarly, no right to enter exists even though an alien has
secured a visa or re-entry permit from immigration officials prior to presenting himself
for inspection at the border. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(h), 1203(e) (1982); Hofstein, The Returning Resident Alien, 10 N.Y.U. INTrA. L. Rav. 271, 278 (1955).
4. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 329 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953).
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constitutional protections accordingly.5
"Entry" into the United States also determines the applicability of
numerous statutory provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (hereinafter referred to as "the INA" or "the Act"),' most importantly, the provisions relating to exclusion and expulsion of aliens.
One court recently summarized the statutory importance of an "entry" as follows:
[T]he immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens
who have come to the United States seeking admission and those "in" the
United States after an "entry," irrespective of its legality. The Immigration
and Nationality Act preserves the distinction. Those seeking admission are
subjected to "exclusion proceedings" to determine whether they "shall be
allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported." Aliens once they have
made an "entry" are subject to "expulsion" if they fall within those categories of aliens who may be "deported" by the Attorney General. Proceedings
for expulsion are commonly referred to as "deportation proceedings."

Deportation, although not criminal punishment, can amount to
banishment or exile for one who has been in the country long enough
to establish a home, job, or family.8 Consequently, under the INA,
aliens who have "entered" the United States have greater procedural
and substantive rights than those who have not "entered.",
An entrant alien in expulsion proceedings is entitled to prior notice, the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and other
safeguards under section 242(a) of the Act.1 0 He is also entitled to
certain bond redetermination, 1" venue,12 and appeal process 3 advan5. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 329 (1982); United States ex
rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291 (1904); In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960, 962
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
6. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982). The INA was enacted in 1952, Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), and, "though frequently amended since [then], remains the
basic format of the immigration laws [today]." Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 621 (1975).
7. In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted).
See also Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S.
185, 187 (1958); United States ex rel. Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp. 786, 788
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). The term "deportation" is "frequently used loosely to describe the
physical departure of an alien from the United States under both a deportation order and
an exclusion order." United States ex rel. Lue Chow Yee v. Shaughnessy, 146 F. Supp.
3, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd, 245 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1957). However, in this Comment,
unless the context indicates otherwise, "deportation" will refer to expulsion of aliens who
have made an "entry" into the United States.
8. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945).
9. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958); Maldonado-Sandoval v.
INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982).
11. Section 242(a) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to release an alien
on bond pending deportation proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982). Regulations
promulgated under this section permit immigration judges to review the amount of the
original bond and reduce it in appropriate cases. 8 C.F.R. § 1252.2(b) (1983).
12. A deportation proceeding is usually held near the alien's residence within the
United States, while exclusion proceedings are usually held at the port of entry. Landon
v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 325 (1982) (citing 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.6c (1981)).
13. After exhausting his administrative remedies, an alien who is subject to depor-
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tages. These rights are denied to a non-entrant alien under the more
limited exclusion hearing procedures of sections 236(a) and (b) of
the Act.14
A deportable alien also has several substantive rights which are
denied to an excludable alien. 15 He may be allowed to depart from
the United States voluntarily; 16 he may be allowed to designate the
country to which he will be deported;1 7 and he may seek discretionary suspension of deportation 18 or a stay of deportation.1 9
"Entry" is also important because it determines the basic applicability of the INA's deportation provisions. Section 241(a) of the
INA20 lists nineteen classes of deportable aliens. Membership in
each class is determined either at the time of "entry" or at
some limited or unlimited time thereafter. 1 Section 212(a) of the

tation proceedings may appeal the final order of deportation directly to the court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982). An alien who is subject to exclusion proceedings must
petition the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1982).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (b) (1982). A non-entrant alien may even be denied a
hearing if the Attorney General determines that national security is involved. 8 U.S.C. §
1225(c) (1982). See United States ex rel. Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp. 786,
788 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
15. In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982). See United States ex rel. Camezon v. District
Director of INS, 105 F. Supp. 32, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (1982).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 18990 (1958); In re Cenatice, 16 I. & N. Dec. 162, 164 (1977); In re Pierre, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 467, 470 (1973).
An alien may wish to be excluded rather than expelled, notwithstanding the additional
rights available to him in expulsion proceedings. He would then seek to show that he did
not make an "entry." See, e.g., Cheng v. INS, 534 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1976); In re
Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 218, 220 (1980); In re Yam, 16 I. & N. Dec. 535, 536-37
(1978). Such a claim might be made because an alien who is excluded may reapply for
admission after one year without the permission of the Attorney General; an alien who is
expelled, however, must wait five years to reapply without such permission. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(16), (17) (1982). See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 326 n.4 (1982);
Vitale v. INS, 463 F.2d 579, 580 (7th Cir. 1972); Solis-Davila v. INS, 456 F.2d 424,
427-28 (5th Cir. 1972).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
21. For example, an alien is deportable if he entered the United States without
inspection. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982). See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, reh'g
denied, 103 S. Ct. 14 (1982); Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978); Hernandez-Almanza v. INS, 547 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Ruis, I.D. No. 2923 (BIA
1982).
An alien is also deportable if within five years after entry he is convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1982). See, e.g., Munoz-Casarez v.

INA 22 similarly lists thirty-three classes of excludable aliens. Section
241 (a)(1) 23 provides that an alien is deportable if "at the time of
entry [he] was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable
by the law existing at the time of such entry. 24 Not only is an alien
excludable for belonging to any of the classes included in section
212(a); he is also deportable if, although technically excludable, he
somehow succeeds in making an "entry" into the country.
The issue of "entry" may also arise under the criminal provisions
of the INA, particularly those dealing with alien smuggling. 5 In this
context, the "entry" of the smuggled alien rather than the "entry" of
the accused is important.26
The above discussion illustrates that, for an alien (or for one
charged with assisting the illegal "entry" of an alien), much depends
on whether an "entry" has occurred. The determination of this issue
is significantly more complicated than it might seem because the
term "entry" has acquired a special technical meaning.2

INS, 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975); Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.
1974); In re Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 218 (1980). Under this section and others providing for deportation upon the occurrence of an event some time after "entry," the alien
will seek to establish that an "entry" did not occur at a particular time. The issue in
these cases is not the type of proceeding to which the alien will be entitled, but whether
he should be deported.
Likewise, an alien is deportable if at any time after entry he becomes affiliated with
the Communist Party. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(C) (1982). See, e.g., Bonetti v. Rogers,
356 U.S. 691 (1958); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); United States ex rel.
Belfrage v. Kenton, 224 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1955); Grubisich v. Esperdy, 175 F. Supp.
445 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) provides in part:
Any person . . . who(1) brings into or lands in the United States. . .or attempts. . . to bring into
or land in the United States . . .; [or]
i) *wilfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to encourage or
induce . . . the entry into the United States ofany alien. . . not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States . . .shall be guilty of a felony
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), in conjunction with 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982), imposes
criminal punishment as a principal on one who aids and abets an alien in illegally entering the United States. See United States v. Oscar, 496 F.2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1974).
26. United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982). "Entry" of
the illegal alien determines the proper charge against the alleged smuggler. For example,
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) and 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982), the government must prove the
actual "entry" of the smuggled alien to obtain a conviction. However, under 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1) (1982) and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4) (1982), the government need only show an
attempt at or inducement of "entry." E.g., United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d at,
1275; United States v. Hanna, 639 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1981).
27. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 641 (1954).
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THE BASIC DEFINITION OF "ENTRY"

No statutory definition of "entry" existed prior to 1952.28 There-

fore, in early cases dealing with the exclusion, deportation, and criminal provisions of the immigration laws which used the term "entry,"

courts were required to develop a judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court defined "entry" as "any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first
or any subsequent one."2' 9 This interpretation and subsequent judicial modifications became the basis of the statutory definition 30 set
forth in section 101(a)(13) of the INA31 which provides:
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States,
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into
the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien
proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a
foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or
in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided, That' no person
whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation proceedings, extradition,
or other legal process shall be held to be entitled to
32
such exception.

The Board of Immigration Appeals33 has developed the following
four-part test for determining if an -"entry" has occurred:
An "entry" involves (I) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States, i.e., physical presence; plus (2) inspection and admission by an im28. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 453 (1963).
29. United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933).
30. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 453-57 (1963).
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982).
32. Id. (emphasis in original). Authorities have consistently agreed that "entry"
has the same meaning in all immigration law contexts. Referring to the statutory definition, the court in United States v. Oscar, 496 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1974), noted that "[iut
is unlikely that Congress would define a term in § 1101 [section 101] for use throughout
Chapter 12 [the INA] if it intended the term to have different meanings in different
sections of the chapter." Id. at 494. Accord United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730,
737 n.13 (1st Cir. 1980). Cf. Note, Administrative Law--Status of Alien-Paroled
Alien Is Not Within the United States, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 375-77 (1959),
which suggests that the meaning of the phrase "within the United States," often equated
with "entry," should vary depending on what an alien seeks.
33. The Board of Immigration Appeals was created under regulations promulgated
by the Attorney General. It is a quasi-judicial body with exclusively appellate functions
and is entirely separate from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Appeals to the
Board may be taken from, inter alia, decisions of immigration judges in exclusion and
expulsion cases. Selected decisions of the Board are designated by the Board as precedents to be followed in all future cases. I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.10a-l.10c (1983). In this Comment, references to decisions
by "the courts" include Board decisions because of their precedential significance.

migration officer; or (3) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the
nearest inspection point; coupled with (4) freedom from restraint.m

The following discussion will combine a phrase-by-phrase analysis of
the statutory definition of "entry" with an examination of the four
parts of this formula.
ELEMENTS OF THE STATUTORY DEFINITION

"Any Coming of an Alien"

In the earliest immigration statutes, Congress probably intended
the term "entry" to refer to an alien's first arrival in the United
States. 5 However, the Supreme Court long ago concluded that the
provisions of the immigration laws were intended to apply to any
entry by an alien, regardless of a previous "entry" or residence in the
United States. 6 This "re-entry" rule is particularly important in
cases where the government seeks to deport an alien under section
241(a) of the INA37 for committing a particular act or acquiring a
particular status within five years after "entry." ' Under that section, the five-year period begins to run from the latest "entry," not
necessarily the original "entry." 39
34. In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). The Board has consistently applied this formula in determining the issue of
"entry." See In re Lin, I.D. No. 2900 (BIA 1982); In re Yam, 16 I. & N. Dec. 535, 536
(1978); In re Cenatice, 16 I. & N. Dec. 162, 165 (1977). See also Cheng v. INS, 534
F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1976) (reference to the Pierre formula by a court of appeals).
35. Gordon, When Does an Alien Enter the United States?, 9 FED. B.J. 248, 249
(1948). Clearly, an alien arriving in the United States for the first time may be attempting an "entry" and will be subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings, depending on
his success in making the "entry." Recent Developments, Requirement of Entry in Excluding Aliens Without a Hearing,53 COLUM. L. REV. 872, 873 (1953). The following
are representative of the many cases which discuss an alien's initial attempt to "enter."
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); Cheng v.
INS, 534 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Ling Yee Suey v. Spar, 149
F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1945); In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); United
States ex rel. Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
36. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 91 (1914). The Court reaffirmed this position
many times, most notably in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
See supra text accompanying note 29. See also Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 296-97
(1914); Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307, 308 (9th Cir. 1932).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
38. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a) (1982) (institutionalization at public expense
for a mental disease or defect) id. at (3); (conviction of a crime of moral turpitude) id. at
(4); (becoming a public charge) id. at (8); (aiding and abetting illegal entry of aliens) id.
at (13); (conviction for failure to register as an alien) id. at (15).
39. Review Note, Immigration and Nationality-Meaningof "Entry" Under Immigration and Nationality Act-Status of Territory Under United States Trusteeship,
32 TUL. L. REV. 778, 779 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Note, Status of Territory]; Note,
The Meaning of "Entry" in the Immigration Law, 7 LAW. GUILD REV. 265 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Meaning of "Entry']. For example, where an alien first "entered" in 1956, departed and "re-entered" in 1969, and was convicted in 1970 of voluntary manslaughter, A crime involving moral turpitude, he was deportable under section
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Although "entry" refers to both an original "entry" and a "reentry," the acts which constitute "re-entry" may vary with the status
of the alien. A lawful permanent resident alien 40 may, under certain
circumstances, depart from and return to the United States without
being subjected to the consequences of an "entry."' 1 Other aliens,

however, are deemed to make an "entry" upon each return.
It should be noted that the terms "entry" and "lawful admission"
are not synonymous.4 2 "Entry" applies to both legal and illegal entries into the United States.4 Illegal entry can be accomplished in a
variety of ways but, if apprehended, the alien is always subject to
'4
deportation because he has made an "entry."
241(a)(4) of the Act, (8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1982)). Munoz-Casarez v. INS, 511 F.2d
947 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Annello ex rel. Annello v. Ward, 8 F. Supp. 797 (D. Mass.
1934). The alien would not have been deportable if he had not "re-entered" in 1969
because the conviction took place more than five years after his original "entry." See
United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 426 (1933). See also Hofstein, supra
note 3, at 278. His "re-entry" subjected him to the provisions of section 241(a)(4) as if
he had never previously resided in the United States.
40. "The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of
having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States
as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having
changed." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1982). An alien may be admitted to the country as a
lawful permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1154 (1982) or he may have his status
adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident after he has entered the country. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1255, 1255b (1982).
41. The statutory definition of "entry" contains an exception clause which pertains
to the return of lawful permanent resident aliens. See supra text accompanying note 32.
This clause has been the subject of extensive judicial construction. See infra notes 138182 and accompanying text.
42. In re Chow, 146 F. Supp. 487, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
43. Section 241(a)(2) of the Act specifically provides for the deportation of aliens
who "enter" the United States without inspection or are in the country in violation of
any law of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2) (1982). "The clear objective of this
section is to protect the integrity of the boundaries of the United States by requiring
every alien to submit to inspection by immigration officials each time he enters this country." In re Ruis, I.D. No. 2923 (BIA 1982).
44. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 14 (1982) (dictum);
Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975) (false claim of citizenship); Hernandez-Almanza v.
INS, 547 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1976) (crossing border at a location not designated as a
port of entry); Cacho v. INS, 547 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1976) (fraudulent misrepresentations used to secure admission); Bufalino v. INS, 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 928 (1973) (false claim of citizenship); Lazarescu v. United States, 199 F.2d
898 (4th Cir. 1952) (fraudulent concealment of prior deportation); United States ex rel.
Shirrmeister v. Watkins, 171 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 942 (1949) (refusal to depart after being given opportunity to do so); United States ex rel. Anderson v.
Karnuth, 46 F.2d 689 (W.D.N.Y. 1930) (overstay after expiration of temporary permit);
In re Lewiston-Queenston Bridge, 17 I. & N. Dec. 410 (1980) (crossing after exclusion);
In re A-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 356 (1961) (escape from detention). See generally Gordon,
supra note 35. See infra notes 94-124 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
voluntary or involuntary nature of an alien's "entry."

"Into the United States"
To make an "entry," an alien must cross into the territorial limits
of the United States; he must be physically present within the country's borders.4 5 Because this requirement is usually susceptible to
precise measurement, 46 it is seldom an issue.47 A more important
consideration under this portion of the definition of "entry" is the
distinction made between mere physical presence and physical presence coupled with freedom from official restraint. 8 Merely crossing
the international border does not necessarily constitute "entry."' 9
Rather, when an alien is detained pending determination of his right
to enter, he is regarded as "stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction"
although he is physically within the borders of the United States.50
This fiction of being stopped at the border has been consistently followed, the rationale being that while the alien is subject to official
restraint or custody he has not been admitted into the United States
'
and has therefore not made an "entry." 51
Of course, in addition to bearing the consequences of having made an "entry," the
illegal entrant is also entitled to the rights and protections available in deportation proceedings. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text. See also United States ex reL
Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp. 786, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); In re EstradaBetancourt, 12 1. & N. Dec. 191 (1967).
45. See supra text accompanying note 34.
46. Gordon, supra note 35, at 248.
47. One Board of Immigration Appeals decision does illustrate a potential problem. In In re Barreto, 15 I. & N. Dec. 498 (1975), an alien submitted to pre-flight
inspection by a United States immigration officer in Toronto, Canada. Initially the officer
stamped the alien's passport and visa approving admission into the United States, but,
before the airline flight departed, the officer crossed out the admission stamps, having
become suspicious of the alien's grounds for admission. Pursuant to the instructions of
the immigration officer, the alien reported to the Chicago immigration office upon her
arrival in the United States and was placed in exclusion (rather than deportation) proceedings. The Board found that exclusion proceedings were appropriate because the alien
had not achieved physical presence within the geographical boundaries of the United
States when the admission stamps were cancelled and therefore had not effected an "entry." Id. at 500. Presumably, if the alien had been physically present within the United
States when admission was approved, her right to remain in the country could have been
questioned only in deportation proceedings because she would have effected an "entry."
See In re V-Q--, 9 I. & N. Dec. 78 (1960). Barreto's subsequent physical presence did
not constitute an "entry" because she was never free of official restraint. See infra notes
48-71 and accompanying text.
48. See supra text accompanying note 34.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (Holmes, J.) (an alien
who arrived in the United States but was detained aboard his ship pursuant to orders of
an immigration officer had not made an "entry").
50. Id. at 263.
51. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (harborage at Ellis Island);
United States v. Oscar, 496 F.2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1974) (direction to secondary inspection area for further investigation); United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197
(3d Cir. 1954) (detention on board ship); In re Cenatice, 16 I. & N. Dec. 162, 165
(1977) (detention on board ship and at alien detention facility); In re Pierre, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 467, 469 (1973) (detention on board ship). The enactment of the statutory definition of "entry" in 1952 did not affect judicial interpretation of the term regarding free-
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Such a rule is necessary in a practical sense because most of the
designated ports of entry are some distance inside the borders of the
United States.52 However, physical presence within the confines of a
port of entry does not necessarily connote physical restraint. An
alien's physical presence may be accompanied by freedom from restraint and result in an "entry" even though the two elements coincide at a port of entry. 53
Apparently neither the length nor the timing of an alien's detention affects his status as a non-entrant. The determination of an
alien's right to enter may take months or years." An alien is deemed
to enjoy only a "temporary haven" in the United States during this
time and any delays which occur as a result of his efforts to gain
admission do not elevate his position to that of an entrant. 55 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that detention of an alien after
an order of exclusion has been rendered does not result in "entry" of
the alien.56
To be deemed subject to official restraint, an alien need not be in
the actual physical custody of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (hereinafter referred to as "the Service"). He may instead be
held in "constructive custody" which can take at least two forms.
dom from official restraint. In re Dubbiosi, 191 F. Supp. 65, 66 (E.D. Va. 1961).
52. [I]n a literal and physical sense a person coming from abroad enters the
United States whenever he reaches any land, water or air space within the territorial limits of this nation. But the actual clearance of persons who seek admission in regular course is accomplished at designated stations, many of them located as a matter of convenience some distance inside the national boundary. In
these circumstances, those who have come from abroad directly to such a station
seeking admission in regular course have not been viewed by the courts as accomplishing an "entry" by crossing the national boundary in transit or even by
arrival at a port so long as they are detained there pending formal disposition of
their requests for admission.
United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1954). Accord In re Phelisna, 551
F. Supp. 960, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
53. For example, in United States v. Martin-Plascencia, 532 F.2d 1316, 1317 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976), the court held that an adolescent alien who had
crawled through an opening in a border fence into the premises of a port of entry had
made an "entry" because he was never subject to any type of official restraint.
54. In In re Cenatice, 16 1. & N. Dec. 162 (1977), aliens who arrived from Haiti
were detained on board their boat and later at an alien detention facility for approximately eleven months prior to a determination of excludability. And in United States ex
rel Tom We Shung v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), arid, 274 F.2d 667
(2d Cir. 1960), determination on an alien's application for admission was pending for
eleven years.
55. United States ex rel. Tom We Shung v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253, 259
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also In re Milanovic, 162 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), arid,
253 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1958) (determination of status pending for seven years).
56. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953).

First, the Service may entrust the alien to another person or entity
who physically detains him. For example, an alien who is brought to
the United States by a carrier must be held by the carrier until the
alien's admissibility is determined. 7 While so detained, the alien is
considered subject to official restraint and is therefore a non-entrant.
The same is true when the Service entrusts an alien to a social service agency. 58 Additionally, detention by non-immigration law enforcement officers constitutes constructive custody when they apprehend an alien at the border and hold him for transfer to the
Service. 9
The second form of-constructive custody does not involve actual
physical detention. An alien\who has come into Service custody prior
to effecting an "entry" and who is released on bond while awaiting
either determination of his right to enter the United States or transportation out of the country after exclusion, is in the constructive
custody of the Service.60 Additionally, section 212(d)(5)(A) of the
INA61 allows the Attorney General to temporarily "parole" an alien
into the United States while the alien's right to lawfully enter the
country is determined. Constructive custody in the form of parole,
like actual custody of an alien pending determination of his admissibility, does not constitute an "entry. 62
57. See, e.g., United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730 (Ist Cir. 1980); Vitale v.
INS, 463 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1972); United States ex reL Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210
F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (all relating. to custody of the alien by an airline).
One administrative device used to permit an alien to physically come into the United
States without making an "entry" is the "transit without visa" or "TRWOV." See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(4)(C), 1228(d) (1982). The court in United States v. Kavazanjian,
623 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1980), explained that this device is designed to facilitate
international travel by permitting an alien to stop in the United States on his way from
one foreign country to another without a passport or visa. The alien's transportation line
must hold him in its custody at all times while he is physically present in the United
States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(c)(1) (1983). He is therefore a non-entrant because he is not
free of official restraint and is deemed stopped at the border. 623 F.2d at 737. See also
Vitale v. INS, 463 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1972); Putrus v. Montgomery, 555 F. Supp. 452
(E.D. Mich. 1982); United States ex rel. Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp. 786
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
58. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) (custody entrusted to the Hebrew
Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society after determination of excludability); Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (detention in a mission house pending determination of right to enter).
59. Klapholz v. Esperdy, 302 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891
(1962) (detention by United States Marshal); In re Yam, 16 I. & N. Dec. 535, 536-37
(1978) (detention by local police).
60. See Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982) (release on bond pending
habeas corpus proceedings); Ng Lin Chong v. McGrath, 202 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1952)
(release on bond while awaiting transportation out of the country); United States ex rel.
Pantano v. Corsi, 65 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1933) (release on bail during pendency of criminal proceedings); In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (release during
habeas corpus proceedings).
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982).
62. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). Section 212(d)(5)(A) specifi-
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An alien might also be considered under constructive restraint although not in physical custody when he is observed attempting to
enter the country illegally. Earlier cases held that an alien who was
under constant surveillance immediately before, during, and after
crossing the border had not made an "entry." 3 However, recent decisions suggest that an alien may make an "entry" even though Service officers observe him surreptitiously crossing the border. 4 These
cases do not specifically repudiate the earlier decisions. Rather, they
simply conclude that an "entry" has occurred under these circumstances without discussing whether the observation amounts to constructive restraint. Whether constant observation of an alien making
a surreptitious crossing amounts to constructive restraint appears to
be unsettled.
An alien is generally deemed to have effected an "entry" upon his
release from custody because he is then free from any legal re-

cally provides that "parole . . .shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien." 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982). That section goes on to provide that:
when the purposes of such parole shall ...have been served the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of
any other applicant for admission to the United States.
Id. In Leng May Ma, the Court observed that parole is "simply a device through which
needless confinement is avoided" and was "never intended to affect an alien's status."
357 U.S. at 190. Accord Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958) (companion case). The
Court further observed that "[p]hysical detention of aliens is ...generally employed
only as to security risks or those likely to abscond." 357 U.S. at 190. For an analysis of
Leng May Ma see Note, supra note 32.
Lower courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have consistently followed the
holding in Leng May Ma. E.g., United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730, 731 (1st
Cir. 1980); Siu Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1969); Wong Hing
Fun v. Esperdy, 335 F.2d 656, 657 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom. Ng Sui Sang v.
Esperdy, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); In re Hinojosa, 17 I. & N. Dec. 322, 323 (1980).
63. E.g., Ex parte Chow Chok, 161 F. 627 (N.D.N.Y.), affid, 163 F. 1021 (2d
Cir. 1908).
64. In Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977), the court found
that a lawful permanent resident alien who was observed crossing the border had made
an "entry." If Ex parte Chow Chok, 161 F. 627 (N.D.N.Y.), arfd, 163 F. 1021 (2d Cir.
1908), were controlling precedent, the court should have found that the alien had not
made an "entry." See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Cheng v. INS, 534 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), noted that Chow
Chok, interpreted a predecessor statute to the current INA and did not control interpretation of the definition of "entry" found in 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(13) (1982). That court,
however, was able to distinguish Chow Chok. In Cheng, a group of aliens had crossed the
border and traveled four-tenths of a mile into the United States before being observed by
a border patrol agent. Because there was no actual or constructive restraint over the
aliens for at least a short time after they crossed the border, the court found that the
aliens had "entered" the United States. 534 F.2d at 1019.

straints imposed by the immigration laws. 5 However, revocation of
parole does not necessarily result in an "entry." Even prolonged inaction by the Service after revoking an alien's parole does not affect
the alien's status as a non-entrant. 66
Escape from actual or constructive custody may be held to be an
"entry," albeit an illegal "entry." Courts have refused to extend the
"fiction" of constructive custody to the situation where an alien escapes from Service custody after issuance of an exclusion order6 7 or
while in transit from one foreign country to another." The rationale
is that such an alien is in the same position as one who crosses the
border surreptitiously.6 9 However, the Board of Immigration Appeals
apparently makes a distinction between those cases where exclusion
proceedings are pending and those where the alien's status or admissibility is settled. The Board has held that after a notice that exclusion proceedings will be held has been served on a detained alien, his
70
subsequent escape does not elevate his status to that of an entrant.
The rationale behind this position is that after the notice is served,
authority over the alien continues until excludability has been determined, regardless of the alien's escape. 1
65. In re Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 218, 220-21 (1980). See also In re A-, 9 I. &
N. Dec. 356 (1961), and cases cited therein.
66. Siu Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1969). In that case,
after finding an alien excludable, the Service temporarily paroled him into the United
States while he awaited arrangements for his transportation out of the country. Parole
was revoked after approximately four months but transportation arrangements were not
completed until nearly twenty months later. The court held that this delay, like delay in
determining an alien's right to enter, did not result in an "entry." Id.
67. United States ex rel. La Barbera v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 573, 574 (2d Cir.
1932) (Hand, J.).
68. United States ex rel. Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp. 786, 790
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).

69. United States ex reL La Barbera v. Commissioner 61 F.2d 573, 574 (2d Cir.
1932) (such an alien is no different from one who "entered by stealth and secreted himself" for a period of time); United States ex rel. Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp.
786, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (alien who escaped from custody of an airline while in transit
from one foreign country to another "was no different from that of a seaman who had
jumped ship or a 'wetback' who entered the United States by swimming the Rio
Grande"). Accord United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730, 739 (1st Cir. 1980).
70. In re Lin, I.D. No. 2900 (BIA 1982).
71. Id. Previously the Board had held that an alien who escaped from his ship

after the Service had ordered that he be detained effected an "entry." In re A-, 9 I. &
N. Dec. 356, 358 (1961). In an attempt to reconcile its holding in Lin with In re A-,
the Board stated the following:
Whether the applicant is ... paroled into the United States or ... kept in
detention at a Service facility [after service of the notice] is not determinative.
His escaping from Service detention does not place him in the same status as an
alien who manages to evade inspection by entering the United States surreptitiously. He has been inspected but not admitted. We therefore, do not choose to
extend our decision in [In re A-] to aliens physically in this country, who are
detained pending exclusion proceedings, and who manage to escape from
detention.
In re Lin, I.D. No. 2900 (BIA 1982). The Board's reasoning is difficult to reconcile with
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An alien's place of "entry" for venue purposes is generally wherever his physical presence within the United States coincides with
freedom from official restraint. He is considered free from official
restraint when the Service grants him permission to "enter," regardless of whether he chooses to remain at his site of detention.7
Courts have made a distinction between the terms "entry" and
"landing." Like "entry," the term "landing" is a word of art, with
its own technical meaning." "Landing" is a broader concept than
"entry" in that once physical presence occurs, the landing is ordinarily complete.74 "Landing" therefore does not require freedom from
official restraint.7 5
"From a Foreign Port or Place or From an Outlying Possession"

In addition to requiring physical presence and freedom from official restraint, "entry" necessarily contemplates an arrival from some
point outside the country."8 Definitional provisions of the INA aid in
the determination of what constitutes coming "from a foreign port or
place." The term "United States," when used in a geographical
sense, is defined in section 101 (a)(38) of the INA 77 as "the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands of the United States. 17 8 "Foreign state" as defined in
section 101(a)(14) 79 "includes outlying possessions of a foreign state,
the holding in United States ex rel. La Barbera v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.
1932). See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. The only factual difference between Lin and La Barbera is that thp alien in La Barbera had already been ordered
excluded while the alien in Lin was awaiting disposition of his application for admission.
72. See United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1954); Lazarescu v.
United States, 199 F.2d 898, 899-901 (4th Cir. 1952). In both of these cases, an alien
crewman was given permission to "enter" at one port but chose to remain on board his
ship until it reached the next port. Proper venue for deportation proceedings was at the
first port where freedom from official restraint was coupled with physical presence.
73. In re Lewiston-Queenston Bridge, 17 1. & N. Dec. 410, 412-13 (1980).
74. Id.
75. The distinction between "landing" and "entry" was illustrated in In re Lewis.ton-Queenston Bridge, 17 I. & N. Dec. 410 (1980). In that case the owner of an international bridge was charged with violating section 271(a) of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a)
(1982). That section imposes penalties on transportation facilities which bring aliens to
the United States and fail to prevent them from "landing" at a place other than one
officially designated as a port of entry. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that
imposition of a penalty on a transportation facility is inappropriate when an alien makes
a "landing" at a port of entry but somehow manages to effect an illegal "entry." 17 I. &
N. Dec. at 413.
76. United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929).
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38) (1982).
78. Id.
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(14) (1982).

but self-governing dominions or territories under mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign states." 80 And section
101(a)(29) 81 defines "outlying possessions of the United States" as
"American Samoa and Swains Island."82 An alien arriving from any
place not included in the definition of United States (that is, a foreign state or an outlying possession of the United States) would be
making an "entry."
Section 212(d)(7) of the INA83 injects an additional consideration
into this issue. That section provides that an alien who leaves
"Guam, Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands of the United States, and
who seeks to enter the continental United States or any other place
under the jurisdiction of the United States" shall be excludable
under certain circumstances.84 Under this provision, aliens who have
been inspected and admitted to Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin
Islands of the United States must submit to an additional inspection
by immigration officials when they travel to any other place which is
part of the United States because they are considered to be proceeding from a foreign area to the United States.8 5 The purpose of section 212 (d)(7) was to prevent excludable aliens from using arrival
in these insular possessions as a means of "entry" into the United
States. 88 Courts have therefore held that the section does not apply
to lawful permanent resident aliens who travel to and return from
them.87 Apparently, only aliens who are not lawful permanent residents of the United States make an "entry" when coming to the
"United States" from an insular possession. 8
80. Id. See Aradanas v. Hogan, 155 F. Supp. 546, 547-48 (D. Hawaii 1957) (trust
territory is a foreign state). See also Note, Status of Territory, supra note 39 (analyzes
Aradanas).

81. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29) (1982).
82. Id.

83. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(7) (1982).
84. Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982) for conditions determining excludability.
85. United States ex rel. Alcantra v. Boyd, 222 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1955).
86.

Id.

87. Id. See also Haymes v. Brownell, 131 F. Supp. 784, 785 (D.D.C. 1955). Cf.
United States ex rel. Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436, 438 n.1 (2d Cir. 1957) (return of a
lawful permanent resident alien from Puerto Rico is not an "entry"); United States v.
Paquet, 131 F. Supp. 32, 33-34 (D. Hawaii 1955), affid, 236 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1956)
(Wake Island is not a foreign port or place).
88. The Supreme Court considered an interesting but somewhat peculiar problem
regarding coming from a foreign port or place in Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637
(1954). The case concerned an "alien" who was born in the Philippine Islands as a national of the United States. ("National of the United States" is defined in 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(22) (1982) as "(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though
not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.") The
"alien" came to the continental United States in 1930 and lived in this country continuously from that date. In "1946 the Philippine Islands received final independence from the
United States, resulting in a change in status of persons born there from nationals to
aliens. The Service sought to deport the alien on the basis of 1941 and 1950 convictions
for crimes of moral turpitude. The Court held that the alien had never made an "entry"
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In interpreting the coming "from a foreign port or place" portion

of the "entry" definition, courts have created a fiction regarding the
nature of vessels as United States territory. "[A]n American vessel

is deemed to be a part of the territory of the state within which its
home port is situated, and as such a part of the territory of the
United States."8 9 When an alien embarks on such a vessel at a port
of the United States, goes to sea, and returns to this country without
having been in any foreign port or place, his return is not an "entry."90 In essence, the alien has never left the United States and
therefore could not be coming from a foreign port or place. On the
other hand, if the vessel goes into a foreign port and returns to the
United States, the alien's return is an "entry." 91 This is so regardless
of whether he goes ashore in the foreign port. 2 However, an alien
does not make an "entry" into the United States by embarking on
an American vessel in a foreign port because such a vessel outside
93
the United States is not deemed to be United States territory.
"Whether Voluntary or Otherwise"
Pursuant to the statutory definition, an "entry" into the United
States may be accomplished by either voluntary or involuntary
means. Several important considerations pertaining to the manner in
which an alien attains physical presence in the United States may
determine whether an "entry" has been made.
on which a deportation order could be based because he had not come from a foreign
port or place. Rather, at the time of his arrival, he was a United States national moving
from an insular possession to the mainland. Having based its decision on this ground, the
Court did not reach the alien's claim that he had not made an "entry" because he was
not an "alien" at the time he came to this country. Id. at 642.
89. Weedin v. Banzo Okado, 2 F.2d 321, 322 (9th Cir. 1924) (quoting In re Ah
Sing, 13 F. 286, 289 (9th Cir. 1882)). Accord Ex parte Kogi Saito, 18 F.2d 116, 118
(W.D. Wash. 1927); Ex parte T. Nagata, 11 F.2d 178, 179 (S.D. Cal. 1926).
90. United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929) (dictum).
Accord Ex parte Kogi Saito, 18 F.2d 116, 118 (W.D. Wash. 1927); Ex parte T. Nagata,
11 F.2d 178, 179 (S.D. Cal. 1926).
91. United States ex reL Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929). Accord
United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129, 132 (1932); United States v. Maisel,
183 F.2d 724, 725 (3d Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Schlimmgen v. Jordon, 164 F.2d
633, 636 (7th Cir. 1947); United States ex reL Roovers v. Kessler, 90 F.2d 327, 328 (5th
Cir. 1937); McCandless v. United States ex reL Pantoja, 44 F.2d 786, 787 (3d Cir.
1930); Ex parte Tatsuo Saiki, 49 F.2d 469, 470 (W.D. Wash. 1930).
92. United States ex reL Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129, 132 (1932); United States
v. Maisel, 183 F.2d 724, 725 (3d Cir. 1950).
93. United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929).

Voluntary Entries
An alien may voluntarily cross into the United States either by
presenting himself for inspection at a designated port of entry or by
evading such inspection. If the alien presents himself for inspection,
he is generally not deemed to have made an "entry" until he is advised of his right to enter by immigration authorities.94
Permission to enter the United States may be granted to an alien
in a variety of forms. Examples range from the conditional landing
permit, which allows an alien to stay for only a limited period of
time,9 5 to lawful permanent resident status, which permits the alien
to remain indefinitely.90 However, once admission in any form has
been granted, the alien has made an "entry."
An alien who submits to inspection and is admitted has not necessarily effected a legal "entry." If the alien obtains permission to
enter by making fraudulent misrepresentations to the inspector 7 or
by falsely claiming to be a United States citizen,"' his "entry" is
considered one without inspection and therefore illegal.9 9 If discovered after such an "entry," the alien is deportable under section 241
(a)(2) of the INA. 100
94. Any delay or detention pending determination of the alien's right to enter
does not elevate his status to that of an entrant. See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1282 (1982). This permit allows an alien crewman to come into
the United States temporarily for not more than twenty-nine days while his ship is in
port. The permit differs from parole in that the alien is free from official restraint.
Stanisic v. INS, 393 F.2d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 62
(1969). Cf. In re Dubbiosi, 191 F. Supp. 65, 66 (E.D. Va. 1961) (no "entry" was made
because, although a permit had been issued, the alien remained under official restraint
until arrested for alien smuggling). The crewman is considered to have made an "entry"
and may only be deported, not excluded, if he breaches the conditions of his admission.
See Couto v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 758 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
United States ex rel. Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
96. See Cacho v. INS, 547 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1976); Del Castillo v. Carr, 100
F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1938).
97, See Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975); Bufalino v. INS, 473 F.2d 728 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); Ben Huie v. INS, 349 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir.
1965); In re Kolk, 11. & N. Dec. 103 (1965).
98. Aliens who enter as citizens, rather than as aliens, are treated substantially differently by immigration authorities. The examination to which citizens
are subjected is likely to be considerably more perfunctory than that accorded
aliens. . . The net effect ... of a person's entering ... as an admitted alien is
that the immigration authorities ... require and obtain information and a variety of records that enable them to keep track of the alien after his entry. Since
none of these requirements is applicable to citizens, an alien who enters by
claiming to be a citizen has effectively put himself in a quite different position
from other admitted aliens, one more comparable to that of a person who slips
over the border and who has, therefore, clearly not been inspected.
Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 624-25 (1975) (quoting Goon Mee Heung v. INS, 380 F.2d
236, 237 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967)).
99. See supra note 43.
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982).
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An alien can also voluntarily come into the United States by evading inspection. 10 1 If intentional and free from official restraint, a
crossing at a place other than one designated as a port of entry is
clearly an illegal "entry.1 10 2 An alien's technical admissibility at the
time of such an illegal "entry" does not save him from being deportable. 10 3 Moreover, even a temporary evasion of the inspection process
will produce an "entry."104
Even if an alien is physically present and free of official restraint,
he may avoid the consequences of an "entry" if he intends to present
himself for inspection (rather than evade it) and follows the ordinary
path from the international border to the nearest inspection station.10 5 As noted above,106 such a rule is necessary because most

ports of entry are located some distance from the actual territorial
boundaries.10 7 The question of an alien's intent to report for inspec-

tion is a factual one and its resolution often rests on whether the
surrounding circumstances suggest that the alien was following the

normal route to the nearest inspection station.10 8 The alien must not

only proceed by the usual path to an inspection station; he must also
proceed to the nearest inspection station. Proceeding to an inspection
101. See In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467 (1973); see also supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
102. See Corona-Palomera v. INS, 661 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1981); Fleurinor v.
INS, 585 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Martin-Plascencia, 532 F.2d
1316, 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); In re Legaspi, III. & N. Dec.
819, 820 (1966).
103. In re Ruis, I.D. No. 2923 (BIA 1982).
104. United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730, 739 n.19 (Ist Cir. 1980).
105. Thack v. Zurbrick, 51 F.2d 634, 635 (6th Cir. 1931).
106. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
107. Thack v. Zurbrick, 51 F.2d 634, 635 (6th Cir. 1931).
108. United States ex rel. Giacone v. Corsi, 64 F.2d 18, 19 (2d Cir. 1933). For
example, in Cheng v. INS, 534 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1976), a group of aliens hidden in a
van crossed the Canadian border into the United States. Instead of following the normal
route to the nearest inspection station, the van traveled without lights on another road. It
was equipped with a device to deactivate the border patrol's vehicle detection apparatus
and the driver had been apprehended one week earlier for surreptitiously entering the
same way. The court found this to be "overwhelming . . .evidence of actual and intentional evasion of inspection."Id. at 1019.
In In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), the court rejected actual intent
would
to evade inspection as an element of "entry." Rather, the court indicated that "[i]t
be enough that the alien had no intention, whether through ignorance or otherwise, to
follow the usual path to an inspection station." Id. at 963. The court placed on the government the burden of proving that an alien landing at a point far distant from the
inspection station intended to submit himself for inspection and was on his way to do so,
thus not having made an "entry." Id. at 963-64; cf. In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467,
468 (1973), which lists "actual and intentional evasion of inspection" as one of the elements of "entry."

station further away in order to obtain more favorable treatment
may result in a finding of "entry." 109
Involuntary Entries
The statutory definition of "entry" provides that an "entry" occurs
whether an alien's coming into the United States is "voluntary or
otherwise." Early cases, decided before enactment of the 1952 statutory definition of "entry," held that any coming of an alien into the
country from a foreign port or place constituted an "entry" 110 regardless of any involuntariness. Many of these cases involved aliens
whose original entries were illegal and who thereafter departed from
the country. The courts invariably held that when such an alien returned to the United States, he made an "entry" even if his departure was unintentional,"1 " involuntary'1 or unknowing. 1 " When an
illegal alien's departure was voluntary rather than involuntary, the
114
courts also consistently concluded that an "entry" had been made.
109. For example, in In re Estrada-Betancourt, 12 I. & N. Dec. 191 (1967), a
group of aliens had crossed the Rio Grande by boat and landed in the United States
approximately twenty miles from Brownsville, Texas, the nearest inspection station. Instead of proceeding toward Brownsville, the aliens traveled ten miles in another direction
to an airport where they were taken into custody by Service officers. The Board rejected
the Service's position that the aliens had not made an "entry" because, according to their
testimony, they intended to present themselves for inspection at Miami, Florida where
they expected to receive more favorable treatment as refugees. The Board concluded that
expulsion proceedings were appropriate because the aliens, by failing to proceed to the
nearest inspection station, had effected an "entry." Id. at 196. The Board stated that
"only utter chaos in enforcement of the immigration laws could result from permitting
aliens to proceed to inspection points they believe will best suit their own interest." Id.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
111. See, e.g., Zurbrick v. Borg, 47 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1931). In that case, the
court held that an alien's trip from New York to Detroit along a train route which
passed through Canada subjected him to exclusion upon his attempted re-entry. That the
alien had not left the train while in Canada was immaterial to the court, "for, having
passed out of the country, he was an immigrant, and, not having an unexpired immigration visa, he was not entitled to re-enter." Id. at 691.
112. See, e.g., Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1932). There, an illegal
alien had embarked as a crewman on an American vessel, became shipwrecked, and was
forced to land on a Mexican island. Noting that it had no discretion in the matter, the
court reluctantly rejected the alien's claim that he was not subject to exclusion because
he had not intentionally landed on foreign soil. Because the alien was technically coming
from a foreign country, he was subject to the immigration laws as if he had never resided
in the United States. Id. at 308.
113. See, e.g., Ward v. DeBarros, 75 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1935). The facts of this
case were very similar to those in Zurbrick v. Borg, 47 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1931) (discussed supra note 111), except that DeBarros had specifically testified that he did not
know he was entering a foreign territory. (In Borg the court had not mentioned whether
the alien lacked such knowledge.) Following the strict interpretation of "entry," the court
held that ignorance of the location of the border or of one's presence outside the United
States had no effect on the determination of "entry." What the traveller did in fact, not
what he knowingly intended to do, was controlling. The court did intimate, however, that
had the alien been taken out of the country by force or induced to go out through fraud
or deceit, the holding might have been different. Id. at 35.
114. E.g., United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129 (1932) (voyage to
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The alien's return in most of these cases, however, could fairly be
characterized as voluntary, making the holdings arguably less harsh
than those in cases where the departure and return were both
involuntary.
These early cases involving "re-entry" of illegal aliens represent
application of the so-called "per se" or "physical passage" doctrine,
which emphasizes the fact of crossing the border rather than the
alien's intent or knowledge in doing so. 115 Some courts also used this
approach in cases where an alien was brought into the country invol-

untarily for criminal prosecution or imprisonment. According to
these courts, the alien's arrival from a foreign country was control-

ling; the involuntariness of the arrival was irrelevant."'

Other

courts, however, rejected the "per se" doctrine when an alien was
brought into the country under official custody.1 17 The few recent
opinions which discuss this issue agree with the latter position. 11
The conclusion that no "entry" occurs under these circumstances is

most consistent with the theory that an alien does not make an "en-

try" unless he is free from official restraint. 1 It also appears to be

the better rule because of the patent injustice in forcing an alien to
come into the country and then subjecting him to the consequences

of an "entry."
Germany); United States v. Maisel, 183 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1950) (voyage to Philippine
Islands); Del Castillo v. Carr, 100 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1938) (one day trip to Ensenada,
Mexico); United States ex rel. Roovers v. Kessler, 90 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1937) (voyage
to various Central American and Caribbean ports); McCandless v. United States ex rel.
Pantoja, 44 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1930) (voyage to Buenos Aires); United States ex rel.
Drachmos v. Hughes, 26 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.J. 1938), affd, 110 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1940)
(pleasure trip to Canada); In re O'D--, 3 I. & N. Dec. 632 (1949) (flight to Puerto Rico
to avoid criminal prosecution in New York).
115. Recent Cases, Aliens-Immigration and NaturalizationLaws of 1917, 1924
and 1940-Entry, 16 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 549, 550 (1948).
116. In Blumen v. Haff, 78 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 644 (1935),
the court held that aliens who were extradited to the United States to answer grand
larceny charges had made an "entry" and were subject to expulsion proceedings. Accord
In re O'D-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 632 (1949).
117. In United States ex rel. Ling Yee Suey v. Spar, 149 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1945),
the court held that aliens who were arrested for rioting on board their ship and brought
into the United States for prosecution had not made an "entry." The same court followed
this holding in a series of cases involving aliens who were brought into the United States
either as war prisoners or for internment as security risks. United States ex rel. Bradley
v. Watkins, 163 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1947); United States ex rel. Ludwig v. Watkins, 164
F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1947); United States ex rel. Paetau v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1947). Accord United States ex rel. Camezon v. District Director, 105 F. Supp. 32
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (alien brought in under custody for prosecution as a stowaway).
118. See In re Sanchez, 17 1. & N. Dec. 218 (1980); In re Loulos, 16 1. & N. Dec.
34 (1976).
119. See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.

As noted above, cases decided prior to the enactment of the statutory definition held that an alien who departed from and returned to
the United States, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, "re-entered"
upon his return. 120 These decisions seem to have current validity for
aliens who are not lawful permanent resident aliens, particularly because the words "whether voluntary or otherwise" were included in
section 101(a)(13) of the INA.12 ' However, as discussed below, the
statutory definition of "entry" includes an exception to this language
for lawful permanent resident aliens. 22 Because courts and commentators prior to 1952 failed to make a distinction between lawful permanent resident aliens and other aliens in discussing the "voluntariness" issue, 2 3 and because of extensive judicial interpretation of the
24
statutory exception pertaining to lawful permanent resident aliens,1
the issue as it relates to these other aliens is somewhat unsettled.
Currently, no definitive statement of the courts' position regarding
involuntary "entry" by non-lawful permanent resident aliens exists.
The Lawful Permanent Resident Alien Exception
In recent years, lawful permanent resident aliens have received
special treatment by Congress and the courts regarding the issue of
"entry." Because this was not always so, a review of the historical
development of the statutory and judicial rules pertaining to these
aliens is necessary to an understanding of the current law in this
area.
Historical Foundations
As in the cases noted above involving other aliens, 2 5 courts prior
to 1952 generally adhered to a "per se" interpretation of "entry"
when deciding cases involving re-entry of lawful permanent resident
aliens. Most of these cases concerned aliens who voluntarily departed
26
from the United States and returned after some period of time.1
120. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982).
122. See infra notes 138-182 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 35; Recent Cases, supra note 115; Note, The
Meaning of "Entry," supra note 39.
124. See infra notes 138-182 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 110-124 and accompanying text.
126. E.g., United States ex reL Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933) (brief visit to
Cuba); Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 (1914) (one day trip to Canada to procure "a
woman of immoral purpose"); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914) (three month trip
to Russia to visit mother); United States ex rel. Schlimmgen v. Jordon, 164 F.2d 633

(7th Cir. 1947) (voyage as seaman on American vessel which visited various foreign
ports); United States ex rel. Doukas v. Wiley, 160 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1947) (short trips to
Canada for medical treatment); Zurbrick v. Woodhead, 90 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1937)
(shopping trip to Canada for a few hours); Canciamilla v. Haff, 64 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.
1933) (two trips to Italy); Jackson v. Zurbrick, 59 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1932) (visit to
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The courts found an "entry" whenever an alien left the United
States and returned from a foreign country, regardless of the pur127
pose or length of his absence. The results were often quite harsh.
While most courts followed this strict approach,1 28 some indicated
that they did so only because they felt bound to follow precedent.12
A few courts did eventually adopt a more flexible approach, at
least in cases where the lawful permanent resident's departure could
be characterized as involuntary or unintentional. 130 The strongest
Canada for a few hours); United States ex rel. Pellegrino v. Karnuth, 23 F. Supp. 688
(W.D.N.Y. 1938) (trip to Italy); United States ex rel. Siegel v. Reimer, 23 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1938) (two-day sightseeing trip to Canada).
127. For example, in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933),
an alien who had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for nearly
twenty years made a brief visit to Cuba. Upon his return he was admitted after inspection but a few years later, the Service sought to deport him for having been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude (counterfeiting) prior to his "entry." The Supreme
Court held that his return from Cuba was an "entry" and could serve as the basis for his
deportation even though he would not have been deportable if he had never left the
country. Because Volpe's original "entry" took place in 1906, his conviction in 1925, and
his trip to Cuba in 1928, he would not have been deportable for the conviction unless his
1928 return to the United States was considered an "entry." Id. at 425-26.
128. See cases cited supra note 126.
129. For example, in Zurbrick v. Woodhead, 90 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1937), the
alien had been lawfully admitted to the United States in 1924 and remained in the country continuously until 1934 when she went to Canada for a few hours to shop. Two
months later she entered a public hospital for treatment of tuberculosis. Because she was

unable to pay for this hospital care, the Service sought to deport her for becoming a
public charge within five years of "entry." While the court held that her return from the
brief shopping trip was an "entry" making her deportable, it expressed deep regret about
doing so.
Once more we are impelled to direct attention to the toll in human anguish
which so often follows that literal reading of the Immigration Act by which
every departure from the United States, however brief and temporary, and pursuant to no intention to relinquish domicile, constitutes subsequent return a new
entry, subjecting the unsuspecting to exclusion or deportation. But the law is
clear, and however cruel the result, we have no recourse but protest and
recommendation.

Id. See also Comment, Rosenberg v. Fleuti: Reentry of Aliens Remains Unsettled, 56
NOTRE DAME LAW. 696, 697 (1981); Note, A Surreptitious Border Crossing Should
Not Be Considered a "Meaningful Interruption" of Permanent Residence Constituting
an "Entry" Into the United States Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
6 TEX. S.U.L. REV. 139, 140 (1979).

130. In United States ex rel. Valenti v. Karmuth, 1 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y.
1932), an alien youth was compelled by school authorities to participate in a one-day
school outing to Canada. The court held that his return did not constitute an "entry"
because his departure and return were not voluntary. It noted that freedom of action was
an implied prerequisite for an "entry" to occur. Id. at 373. The court in Annello ex rel.
Annello v. Ward, 8 F. Supp. 797 (D. Mass. 1934), made a more drastic departure from
precedent in holding that a brief stop in Canada lasting approximately twenty-five minutes while an alien was in route from one part of the United States to another did not
result in an "entry." The court observed that a strict, literal interpretation of "entry"

impetus for excepting involuntary departures from the concept of
"entry" for lawful permanent resident aliens came in Di Pasquale v.
Karnuth.1 3 1 In that case the court held that "the intent of a carrier,
unknown to the alien, to carry him across a border and back again,
upon a route whose termini are within the United States, should not
be imputed to him." 132 The court drew upon what it believed to be
the legislative intent behind the deportation laws in reaching this
conclusion, stating that it could not believe "that Congress meant to
subject those who had acquired a residence, to the sport of chance,
when the interests at stake may be so momentous.

13 3

It went on to

observe that while "we should be free to rid ourselves of those who
abuse our hospitality

. . .

it is more important that the continued

enjoyment of that hospitality once granted, shall not be subject to
meaningless and irrational hazards. '1 3 4
The Supreme Court adopted the Di Pasquale court's reasoning in
3 5 where the circumstances of war and not
Delgadillo v. Carmichael,'
the alien's voluntary act had caused him to be on foreign soil. The
Court concluded that Congress could not have meant to subject an
alien to the consequences of an "entry" under such "fortuitous and
13 6 Lower courts followed this approach in
capricious" circumstances.
137
cases.
subsequent

leads to absurd and unjust results and concluded that "one who is lawfully within the
country and who goes into a foreign contiguous territory during the course of a practically continuous journey originating and ending within the United States" does not make
an "entry." Id. at 798. The opinion, however, does not specifically discuss the voluntariness of the departure.
131. 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.).
132. Id. at 879. While the alien slept, the train on which he rode, unknown to him,
passed through Canada on its way from Buffalo to Detroit. Judge Hand wrote the opinion for the court, holding that the alien could not be deported for conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within one year after this trip. Compare Ward v.
DeBarros, 75 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1935); Zurbrick v. Borg, 47 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1931)
(similar facts except that the alien involved was illegal rather than legal.) See supra
notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
133. 158 F.2d at 879.
134. Id. For an early analysis of this case, see Recent Cases, Aliens-Immigration
Acts of 1917 and 1924--Lawful and Unlawful Entry, 15 Gao. WAsH. L. REV. 480
(1947).
135. 332 U.S. 388 (1947). The alien in Delgadillo had served on an American
merchant ship during World War II. The ship was torpedoed off the coast of Cuba after
which the alien was rescued and taken to Cuba. One week later he returned to the
United States. Two years after this event, the alien was convicted of robbery and the
government sought to deport him. The Court, however, found that no "entry" had been
made as a result of the alien's return from Cuba. Id. at 391.
136. Id. For an analysis of this case, see Recent Cases, supra note 115.
137. E.g., Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 914 (1950) (voluntary visit to Mexico); Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239,
242 (9th Cir. 1948) (service on a Navy ship); Yukio Chai v. Bonham, 165 F.2d 207, 208
(9th Cir. 1947) (unscheduled stop by vessel in Canada).
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The Statutory Exception
When revis ing the immigration laws in 1952, Congress included
the judicial developments of Di Pasqualeand Delgadillo in the definition of "entry." ' The statute provides that a lawful permanent
resident alien will not be regarded as making an "entry" if he can
prove to the Attorney General's satisfaction that (1) his departure
or (2) his presence in a
was unintended or not reasonably foreseeable
3 9
foreign country was not voluntary.
During the first decade after enactment of the statutory definition,
courts continued to decide cases involving re-entry of lawful permanent resident aliens by considering the voluntariness of the departure. If a court found that an alien's departure or presence in a foreign country was voluntary, it concluded that an "entry" had been
made. 140 Conversely, if it found that the departure or presence was
unintentional or involuntary, it concluded that no "entry" had been
made.14 1 The rule under the statutory definition that an alien does
not make an "entry" when his presence in a foreign country is not
voluntary remains unchanged.14 2 However, those cases interpreting
the portion of the definition dealing with intent to depart have generally been superseded by the relatively recent judicial developments
discussed below.
The Fleuti Doctrine
In 1963 the Supreme Court drastically altered the meaning of the
statutory phrase, "not intended," in the landmark case of Rosenberg
v. Fleuti.143 In that case, the Court acknowledged that the alien had
138. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1684. See Griffith, Deportation and the Alien-Some Aspects, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 329, 345 (1975).
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 32 for the

exact wording of the statute.

. 140. E.g., Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958); Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Pimental-Navarro v. Del Guercio, 256 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1958); Resurreccion-Talavera v. Barber, 231 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1956): United
States ex rel. Belfrage v. Kenton, 224 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1955); United States ex rel.
Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955); In re
P-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 235 (1951).
141. See Savoretti v. United States ex rel. Pincus, 214 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1954);
7 I. & N. Dec. 105 (1956).
In re J-M-D-,
142. See, e.g., In re Farmer, 14 I. & N. Dec. 737, 738 (1974) (impaired mental

capacity renders departure unintended and presence in foreign country involuntary). See

also D. UNGAR, THE CHANGING PICTURE OF IMMIGRATION LAW 69 (C.E.B. Program
Materials 1980).
143. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Fleuti, a lawful permanent resident alien admitted to

voluntarily been present in a foreign country. Nevertheless, it went
beyond the literal meaning of the term "not intended" as used in the
statute1 44 to hold that "an innocent, casual, and brief excursion by a
resident alien outside this country's borders may not have been 'intended' as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status and
therefore may not subject him to the consequences of an 'entry' into
the country on his return. 1 45 The Court reasoned that Congress included the exception clause in the definition of "entry" because it
wished to ameliorate the harsh consequences of the "per se" doctrine
for lawful permanent resident aliens. 146 It construed the intent exception of section 101(a)(13) to mean an "intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded
as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's
147
permanent residence.
To aid lower courts in determining whether a departure was
"meaningfully interruptive," the Court enumerated three factors
which might be considered.
One major factor relevant to whether such intent can be inferred is, of
course, the length of time the alien is absent. Another is the purpose of the
visit, for if the purpose of leaving the country is to accomplish some object
which is itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws, it
would appear that the interruption of residence thereby occurring would
properly be regarded as meaningful. Still another is whether the alien has
to procure any travel documents in order to make his trip, since the need to
obtain such items might well cause the alien 1to48 consider more fully the
implications involved in his leaving the country.

The Court also suggested that other relevant factors might be develthe United States in 1952, visited Mexico for a few hours in 1956 and was readmitted
upon his return. In 1959 the Service sought to deport him under section 241(a)(1) of the
INA (8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982)) as an alien who was a member of an excludable
class at the time of "entry." The Service alleged that Fleuti, as a homosexual, was afflicted with a psychopathic personality and was therefore excludable at the time of "entry" under section 212(a)(4) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982)). The Court did
not reach Fleuti's constitutional attack on the application of the statute because it was
able to decide the case on the basis of statutory construction. 374 U.S. at 451.
144. See Griffith, supra note 138, at 357-58.
145. 374 U.S. at 462.
146. Id. at 458. The Court recognized that the legislative history of the statute
referred only to the decisions of Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947),
and Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947), (see supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text) and that there was "no indication one way or the other ...

of what

Congress thought about the problem of resident aliens who leave the country for insignificantly short periods of time." 374 U.S. at 458. Nevertheless, it expressed the opinion
that Congress had not intended the ameliorative effects of the exception language to be
limited to the facts of those two cases. Id. The four dissenters in Fleuti argued that the
language of the statute was perfectly clear in that the exception pertained only to involuntary or unintentional departures. They accused the majority of rewriting the definition
(something Congress had declined to do) to exclude a permanent resident alien's return
from a brief but voluntary and intentional trip abroad, although this was not Congress'
expressed intention and, in fact, was directly contrary to the Court's earlier holding in
Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 698 (1958). 374 U.S. at 467-68 (Clark, J., dissenting).
147. 374 U.S. at 462.
148. Id.
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oped "by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.

149

Application of the Fleuti Doctrine
The overwhelming majority of recent decisions concerning the
subject of "entry" in immigration law have focused on application of
these "Fleuti factors" and development of additional factors to determine if a lawful permanent resident alien has made an "entry"
upon returning from a trip abroad. 150 The determination of meaningful interruption is a question of fact,151 and the conclusions drawn by
various courts are often difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.
Courts have used various approaches to this problem, placing varying amounts of emphasis on one factor or another. In almost every
152
case, however, the court discusses the "purpose of the visit" factor.
The Supreme Court in Fleuti spoke of both the "purpose of the
visit" and the "purpose of leaving. 1 53 This raises the question of
whether the time of formation of the purpose is relevant to a determination of meaningful interruption. In some cases, courts have held
that the timing of formation of the purpose is irrelevant and that any
unlawful purpose, whether formed prior to departure from the
United States or after arrival in the foreign country, may serve as
the basis for a finding of meaningful interruption.'" Other courts,
however, have held that the unlawful purpose must be formed prior
to or at the time of departure; if an alien leaves the United States
for an innocent purpose but becomes involved in illegal activity while
in the foreign country, his residence is not necessarily meaningfully
interrupted. 55
149.
150.

Id. (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877)).
For a general discussion of the Fleutidoctrine, see Comment, supra note 129;

Griffith, supra note 138.

151. Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1964).
152. See Comment, supra note 129, at 700; Recent Decisions, Immigration-Entry-Resident Alien Who Makes Brief Visit Outside the Country is Deportable
if He Reenters United States at an Unauthorized Location While Aiding Illegal Aliens
to Enter, 11 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 535, 539 (1978). Contra In re Janati-Ataie, 14

I. & N. Dec. 216, 224 (1972).
153. See supra text accompanying note 148.
154. E.g., Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974); Palatian v. INS,
502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974). Accord Cuevas-Cuevas v. INS, 523 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.
1975). The accuracy of this interpretation of the Fleuti "purpose factor" is questioned in
Griffith, supra note 138, at 357. But see Comment, supra note 129, at 700, (suggests
that the time of formation of the unlawful purpose should be irrelevant).
155. E.g., Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972). Cf. LaredoMiranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977) (unlawful purpose formed after departure accompanied by surreptitious return).

Courts also disagree about the relevance of successful accomplishment of the alien's purpose, whenever it is formed. One court has
held in effect that if the alien fails to accomplish his purpose, he does
not make an "entry" when he returns from a foreign country.' 56 Another has held that if the purpose is accomplished either before or
after the alien returns to the United States, he makes an "entry.' 157
Because the Court in Fleuti listed the purpose of the visit as a factor
and not the successful accomplishment of that purpose, actual accomplishment should be irrelevant to whether a departure is meaningfully interruptive. 58
Except for these two points of disagreement, when an alien's purpose in unlawful or "contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws,"' 5 ' courts will usually find that an alien's departure
was intended to be meaningfully interruptive of his residence. This
demonstrates the emphasis that has been placed on the purpose factor. 60 For example, courts have found that where a permanent resident alien participates in alien smuggling,' 6 ' drug smuggling,' 6 2
counterfeiting, 6 3 immigration fraud, 6 or false claim of citizen156. In Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971), an alien had left the
United States and traveled into Mexico in order to avenge an assault and robbery committed on him in Mexico the previous day. He returned to the United States without
having accomplished his goal. The court held that the record was insufficient to show
that the alien's return constituted an entry. Id. at 704.
157. In Longoria-Castenada v. INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 853 (1977), an alien who departed from the country was unsuccessful in carrying
out a meeting in Mexico intended to further a plan to smuggle other aliens into the
United States. He was, however, successful in carrying out his part in the smuggling plan
after his return to the United States. The court, finding that Longoria-Castenada had
made an "entry," attempted to reconcile its decision with that of Yanez-Jacquez v. INS,
440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971)(discussed supra note 156), by pointing out that in the
latter case, the alien had not committed a crime in either the United States or Mexico;
Longoria-Castenada, however, had succeeded in carrying out his unlawful purpose for
departing from the country, even though this success was achieved after he had returned
to the United States. 548 F.2d at 237. This distinction seems rather strained.
158. See Griffith, supra note 138, at 356.
159. See supra text accompanying note 148.
160. Although we recognize that the reason for departing the country is only
one of several major factors which should be considered in determining whether
a departure is a meaningful interruption of residence, we conclude that this one
factor, standing alone, can be deemed sufficient to warrant a finding that a
meaningful interruption of residence has occurred.
In re Valdovinas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 438, 440 (1973).
161. See, e.g., Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977); LongoriaCastenada v. INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977); CuevasCuevas v. INS, 523 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1975); Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975); Solis-Davila v. INS, 456 F.2d 424
(5th Cir. 1972); In re Contreras, I.D. No. 2859 (BIA 1981); In re Valdovinas, 14 1. &
N. Dec. 438 (1973); In re Payan, 14 I. & N. Dec. 58 (1972); In re Valencia-Barajas, 13
I. & N. Dec. 369 (1969).
162. See, e.g., Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974).
163. See, e.g., Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974).
164. See, e.g., In re Leal, 15 I. & N. Dec. 477 (1975).
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ship165 in connection with a departure from and return to the United
States, he has made an "entry" because his residence has been
meaningfully interrupted." 6 Where an alien's purpose in leaving the
United States is lawful, 6 7 courts will usually consider the other factors enumerated in Fleuti or additional factors not enumerated but
considered pertinent to the issue of meaningful interruption.6 8
The Court in Fleuti listed the length of an alien's absence from
the country as a factor to be considered.' e9 However, no particular
length of time is by itself determinative of a meaningful interruption.
If the purpose of the trip was unlawful, almost any length of absence
will be sufficient to lead to a finding of "entry."1 70 If the purpose was
lawful, an absence of only a few hours or days will probably be held
to be "innocent, casual, and brief" and therefore not meaningfully
interruptive.17 ' If the length of the alien's absence is a month or
more, his return will likely be considered an "entry."' 72 A length of
absence which falls between these two guidelines will probably yield
in importance to other factors the court may wish to consider. 73
Rarely is procurement of travel documents decisive in determining
165. See, e.g., Bufalino v. INS, 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928
(1973) (but consideration under Fleuti is of questionable validity because the alien was
not a lawful permanent resident); In re Kolk, 11 1. & N. Dec. 103 (1965).
166. Courts do not necessarily require that the criminal activity be in violation of
immigration law, in terms of the movement of aliens across the border, in order to be
"contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws." Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374
U.S. 449, 462 (1963). See cases cited supra notes 162-163.
167. See, e.g., Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975) (personal business); Munoz-Casarez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975) (visitation of relatives); Itzcovitz v. Selective Service, 447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1971) (business training);
Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965)
(vacation).
168. Of course, these factors may also be considered when the court finds that the
alien's purpose is unlawful.
169. See supra text accompanying note 148.
170. See, e.g., Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242, 1243 (5th Cir. 1977) (less
than one day); Longoria-Castenada v. INS, 548 F.2d 233, 235 (8th Cir), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 853 (1977) (a few hours); Cuevas-Cuevas v. INS, 523 F.2d 883, 884 (9th Cir.
1975) (12 days); Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 1974) (two and one
half days).
171. 374 U.S. at 462. See, e.g., Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 279
(9th Cir. 1975) (two or three days); In re Cardenas-Pinedo, 10 I. & N. Dec. 341, 342

(1963) (a few hours).
172. See, e.g., Munoz-Casarez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1975) (30
days); Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1974) (27 days); In re
Janati-Ataie, 14 I. & N. Dec. 216, 217 (1972) (30 days); In re Abi-Rached, 10 I. & N.
Dec. 551, 551 (1964) (one month); In re Guimaraes, 10 I. & N. Dec. 529, 529 (1964)
(one month).
173. See, e.g., Itzcovitz v. Selective Service, 447 F.2d 893, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1971)
(three weeks but purpose was to fulfill a requirement of the alien's employer).

whether a departure and return constitutes an "entry," but it may
add weight to other factors indicating "entry."117 4 Most cases which
discuss procurement of travel documents refer to the likelihood that
the alien will be prompted to consider
the implications of leaving the
17 5
country, as suggested in Fleuti.
Some courts have considered other factors not enumerated in
Fleuti. Examples include the distance from the United States that
176 and the alien's minority at the time of his
an alien 17travels
7

departure.
One court indicated that it would consider certain additional factors relevant to the hardship an alien is likely to suffer if deported.17 8
These factors include "how long the alien had been a permanent resident of the United States, whether he had a wife and children living
with him, whether he owned a business establishment . . . in the
United States, the nature of the environment to which he would be
deported, and his relation to that environment. '1 79 Although these
considerations clearly bear on the hardship which an alien might suffer if deported, their relevance to meaningful interruption is questionable. The issue of "entry" deals in part with whether one is deportable;1 80 other immigration law provisions set forth avenues of
discretionary or mandatory relief from the hardship of
deportation.""1
Courts disagree regarding whether an alien's subjective intent to
resume residence in the United States after his trip abroad is perti-

174. Very few cases even mention this factor. E.g., Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d
1073, 1079 n.25 (7th Cir. 1974); Bilbao-Bastida v. INS, 409 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 802 (1969); In re Guimaraes, 10 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (1964); In
re Janati-Ataie, 14 I. & N. Dec. 216, 224 (1972).
175. See supra text accompanying note 148. However, in a case involving the issue
of continuous physical presence (see infra text accompanying notes 183-191), one court
indicated that procurement of travel documents for a trip may undercut rather than support the conclusion that an alien's absence was meaningfully interruptive, especially if
the documents were obtained with the expectation that they would confirm continuity of
presence. Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 1979).
176. In re Janati-Ataie, 14 1. & N. Dec. 216, 225 (1972).
177. Toon-Ming Wong v. INS, 363 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1966).
178. Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974).
179. Id. at 1077-78. See also Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
180. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
181. E.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e) (discretionary suspension of deportation), 1253(h)
(stay of deportation) (1982). Indeed, in Longoria-Castenada v. INS, 548 F.2d 233, 23738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977), the court, while recognizing the hardship of uprooting a long-time resident, indicated that the factors outlined in LozanoGiron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974) (see supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text) were more properly considered in connection with application for discretionary
administrative relief. Accord Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting the nature of the environment to which the alien will be deported as a factor for
consideration).
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nent to the issue of meaningful interruption.182 The position taken by
those courts rejecting it as a factor seems better reasoned because
consideration of an alien's intent to resume his residence does not aid
in the determination of whether his departure was meaningfully interruptive. As used by the Supreme Court in Fleuti, the terms "intent" and "meaningful interruption" are synonymous. To say that an
alien intended to resume his residence is the equivalent of saying
that he did not intend to interrupt his residence. This factor therefore seems to be more of a conclusion than a consideration.
Application of the Fleuti Doctrine to the Issue of Continuous
Physical Presence
The Fleuti doctrine has had a far-reaching effect in suspension of
deportation cases. Section 244(a) of the INA18 3 allows the Attorney
General to suspend deportation and adjust a qualifying deportable
alien's status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. Such an alien must have been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years; he
must be of good moral character; and it must be evident that his
deportation would result in extreme hardship to himself or his family.'" The federal courts of appeal have adopted the Fleuti doctrine
of meaningful interruption as the test for determining "continuous
physical presence" under this section.
In 1964, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first applied the
"meaningful interruption" standard to this issue, s5 although the Supreme Court in Fleuti had considered "entry" rather than "continuous physical presence." The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "continuous" was as fluid a concept as "intended." It indicated that "[tlhe
question is whether the interruption, viewed in balance with its consequences, can be said to have been a significant one under the
guidelines laid down in Fleuti."188
182. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
have treated it as relevant. Itzcovitz v. Selective Service, 447 F.2d 888, 894 (2d Cir.
1971); Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 440 F.2d 701, 704 (5th Cir. 1971). However, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Board of Immigration Appeals have consistently rejected it as a consideration. Munoz-Casarez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 1975);
In re Janati-Ataie, 14 I. & N. Dec. 216, 224-25 (1972); In re Kolk, 11I. & N. Dec. 103,
105 (1965); In re Abi-Rached, 10 I. & N. Dec. 551, 553 (1964); In re Guimaraes, 10 I.
& N. Dec. 529, 531 (1964).
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
184. Id.
185. Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
186. Id. at 816.

Courts originally applied the Fleuti factors to the question of continuous physical presence in much the same way as they applied
them to the question of "entry.' ' 117 However, in recent years the
Ninth Circuit has liberalized its approach by holding that the factors
outlined in Fleuti for determining meaningful interruption are only
evidentiary and not conclusive. 18s It reformulated the standard, holding that the court must determine "whether a particular absence
during the seven-year period reduced the significance of the whole
period as reflective of the hardship and unexpectedness of
expulsion."'18
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has rejected this
formulation and retained the Fleuti factors as the test for "continuous physical presence." 190 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in the most recent Ninth Circuit case on this issue.19 ' The Court's
decision should resolve the conflict among the circuits and may clarify the confusion surrounding the Fleuti "re-entry" definition.
Application of the Fleuti Doctrine in Other Contexts
The exception clause of section 101(a)(13), which the Supreme
Court interpreted in Fleuti, expressly pertains only to lawful permanent resident aliens. 92 Nevertheless, courts have discussed Fleuti in
cases where the alien does not have lawful permanent resident
status.
A difficult question concerning the applicability of Fleuti arises
when an alien has unlawfully secured his permanent resident status.
Courts which have considered this issue agree that Fleuti should be
applied to the departure and return of all aliens who have been
granted permanent resident status. 93 The proper forum for adjudicating the lawfulness of the alien's original admission is a deportation hearing; the alien cannot be excluded on the basis of the questioned original "entry" when he makes an innocent, casual, and brief
187. See Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495, 500-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
819 (1977); Barragan-Sanchez v. Rosenberg, 471 F.2d 758, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1972); Git
Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151, 152-54 (9th Cir. 1966); In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec.
167, 169 (1979).
188. Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1979).
189. Id. Accord Sida v. INS, 665 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1981); deGallardo v. INS,
624 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Herrera, I.D. No. 2853 (BIA 1981).
190. Fidalgo-Velez v. INS, 697 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1983). The court reasoned
that Congress intended the words "continuous physical presence" to be literally interpreted because the word "presence" rather than "residence" was used in the statute. Id.
at 1029.
191. Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct.
291 (1982).
192. See supra text accompanying note 32.
193. Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Rangel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 789, 790-92 (1976).
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194
excursion outside the United States.

Most courts have held that Fleuti is not applicable in the case of
an alien who has never been granted permanent resident status. 19 5
However, at least one court has discussed Fleuti in connection with
the claims of an alien who was admittedly present in the United
States illegally.196 That court determined that Fleuti provided no relief to the alien, not because application of Fleuti was improper, but
because the alien's departure had not been innocent, brief, or casual.
The outcome of the case was therefore the same as if Fleuti had not
been applied. Nevertheless, because Fleuti and the statutory exception pertain only to lawful permanent resident aliens, this discussion
by the court seems inappropriate and could lead to further confusion
of the Fleuti doctrine.
The Exception to the Exception-DepartureDue to Legal Process
The last clause of the statutory definition of "entry" indicates that
a lawful permanent resident alien whose departure from the United
States was due to deportation, extradition or other legal process is
not entitled to the benefit of the unintentional/involuntary exception
to the definition of "entry.1197 Because this exception is not available
to such an alien, the benefits of Fleuti are also not available to
him.198 When an alien crosses into a foreign country, either voluntarily or involuntarily, because of legal proceedings against him there,
his subsequent return to the United States is an "entry," whether he
is a lawful permanent resident alien or not.
194. Id.
195. See Martinez-Martinez v. INS, 480 F.2d 117, 118 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1066 (1973); In re Legaspi, 11 1. & N. Dec. 819 (1966).
196. Bufalino v. INS, 473 F.2d 728, 730 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928
(1973).
197. See supra text accompanying note 32.
198. In In re Caudillo-Villalobos, 11I. & N. Dec. 15 (1965), affd sub nom. Caudillo-Villalobos V. INS, 361 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966), the Board held that an alien's
weekly trips to Mexico to sign a bond book in the office of a court clerk while his appeal
from a criminal conviction there was pending resulted in an "entry" each time he returned to the United States. Id. at 20. If his departures had not been occasioned by legal
process in Mexico, his returns might not have been considered "entries" under Fleuti,
despite the frequency of his trips. Accord In re Acosta, 14 I. & N. Dec. 666 (1974). In
In re Wood, 12 1. & N. Dec. 170 (1967), the Board found that an alien who twice
voluntarily appeared in a Canadian court to answer criminal charges was held to the
consequences of an "entry" upon each of his returns to the United States. The Board in
that case, however, did not refer to the statutory provision relating to legal process. Instead, it reached its conclusions by applying the Fleuti test and determining that the
alien's departures were not innocent, casual, and brief excursions. Nevertheless, the results were the same as if the legal process language had been applied.

CONCLUSION

The issue of "entry" in immigration law is multifaceted. Its resolution determines an alien's rights and liabilities in numerous contexts. The seemingly straightforward language of the statutory definition of "entry" has been construed to mean much more than the
words facially might suggest. This is particularly true regarding the
exception in the definition pertaining to unintentional and involuntary departures by lawful permanent resident aliens. The evolution
of the current judicial interpretation of the statute has followed a
path described by a commentator nearly forty years ago.
[P]rogress in statutory interpretation is from language to fact. The courts'
first tendency is to look at the barren word and to define it unimaginatively;
as the statute is used more and more (and perhaps as experience demonstrates that hard cases are made by the bad law of the early interpretation)
the courts look less at the barren word and more at the facts-the milieu in
which the statute is to be applied. This development is apparent in the
courts' handling of the word "entry" in the federal immigration law.199

This Comment has set forth the current state of the law on the
issue of "entry." As with every significant legal issue, though, one
must question the validity of distinctions which are based on a determination such as "entry." For example, an alien who circumvents
immigration laws and "enters" the country illegally is given greater
procedural rights than an alien who applies for admission through
legal channels and is paroled into the country pending determination
of his right to "enter." It might appear that this system rewards the
illegal entrant and penalizes the non-entrant applicant. But it also
appears that, in many cases, the entrant has more to lose than the
non-entrant if he is ordered to leave the country. The substantive
consequences of "entry" may outweigh the procedural advantages
available to the entrant. When viewed this way, the "entry" distinction seems to have some validity.
Other difficult questions arise regarding "re-entry" of lawful permanent resident aliens. Should courts even consider the "entry" issue
except in cases dealing with original "entries"? Should a lawful permanent resident alien be deportable simply because he has left the
country and returned? The activity which provides the underlying
basis for deportation is often present whether he leaves the United
States or not; yet, only if he "re-enters" upon his return may he be
deported. Perhaps the law is intended to allow us to expel at least
some aliens considered undesirable even though we have no basis for
deporting others who are equally undesirable. But should the decisive factor be "entry" or should it be the alien's undesirable activity?
These and other difficult questions may be worthy of consideration
199.

Note, Meaning of "Entry," supra note 39, at 265.
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in any case where the issue of "entry" arises. Perhaps with the growing concern about our immigration laws, Congress and the courts
will re-examine the substantive basis for the technical rules which
have been developed to determine "entry" and an alien's resulting
rights and liabilities.
JULIE

A.

JONES

